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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal from 
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a supplementary order entered following the District Court’s 
ruling and entry of an order on cross-motions for summary 
judgment in a case arising out of a workplace accident at a 
Philadelphia parking garage.  Appellee, Ramara, Inc. 
(“Ramara”), the garage owner, engaged Sentry Builders 
Corporation (“Sentry”) as a general contractor to perform work 
at its parking garage, and, in turn, Sentry engaged a 
subcontractor, Fortress Steel Services, Inc. (“Fortress”), to 
install concrete and steel components as part of the work.  As 
required by its subcontracting agreement with Sentry, Fortress 
obtained a general liability insurance policy (“the Policy”) from 
Westfield Insurance Group (“Westfield”) naming Ramara as an 
additional insured under the Policy.  While Fortress was 
working on the project in April 2012, one of its employees on 
the job, Anthony Axe, was injured in an accident.  As a result of 
his injury, Axe filed a tort action against Ramara and Sentry but 
he did not include Fortress as a defendant as it was immune 
from actions at law by its employees for injuries suffered on the 
job if they were entitled to compensation for their injuries under 
the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act (“Act”).1  Ramara 
tendered its defense in Axe’s action to Westfield.  But Westfield 
declined to defend Ramara as it claimed that Axe’s complaint 
against Ramara did not include allegations imposing that 
obligation on it under its Policy with its applicable 
endorsements.  Ramara responded by initiating this action.   
 
 Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the 
District Court on November 24, 2014, granted partial summary 
judgment to Ramara and denied summary judgment to 
                                                 
1 The parties on this appeal do not question that Axe was 
entitled to compensation for his injuries under the Act. 
4 
 
Westfield.  Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 69 F. Supp. 3d 
490 (E.D. Pa. 2014).  The Court on December 19, 2014, entered 
a supplemental order that included a quantified judgment in 
favor of Ramara against Westfield for Ramara’s counsel fees 
and costs incurred to date and ordered that Westfield 
“prospectively . . . provide defense to Ramara in the underlying 
action . . . .”  App. 21.  Westfield timely appealed from the 
December 19, 2014 order.  We address two issues on this 
appeal:  whether we have jurisdiction and, if so, whether 
Westfield must defend Ramara in the Axe action.  
  
 
II.  JURISDICTION 
 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 based on diversity of citizenship 
and, as we will explain, even though Ramara argues that we do 




III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 We exercise plenary review in determining whether we 
have jurisdiction.  See In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) 
Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 751 F.3d 150, 155-56 (3d Cir. 2014); 
Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 639 (3d Cir. 2003).  If 
“we determine that we do not have jurisdiction over this appeal, 
our ‘only function remaining [will be] that of announcing the 
fact and dismissing the cause.’”  Elliott v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 
682 F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 
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S.Ct. 1003, 1012 (1998)).  If, however, we determine that we 
have jurisdiction, our review of the District Court’s 
interpretation of the Policy applying Pennsylvania law will be 
plenary.  See Elec. Ins. Co. v. Rubin, 32 F.3d 814, 815 (3d Cir. 
1994).  In these circumstances, in determining whether the 
underlying complaint triggered an obligation under the Policy on 
Westfield to defend Ramara, we view the factual allegations in 
the complaint as true and “liberally construe[ ] [them] in favor 
of [Ramara].”  Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
193 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Biborosch v. 
Transamerica Ins. Co., 603 A.2d 1050, 1052 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1992)). 
 
 Moreover, we exercise plenary review over a district 
court’s grant of summary judgment.  Blunt v. Lower Merion 
Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 
S.Ct. 1738 (2015); Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225, 
229 (3d Cir. 2008).  Under this standard, a court will “grant 
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  There is a 
genuine dispute of material fact if the evidence is sufficient for a 
reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the nonmoving 
party.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 
S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986).  But a mere “scintilla of evidence” in 
the nonmovant’s favor does not create a genuine issue of fact, 
id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512, and the non-movant may not rest 
on speculation and conjecture in opposing a motion for 
summary judgment.  Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., 





IV.  BACKGROUND 
 
 A. Factual Background  
 
 As we have indicated, Ramara engaged Sentry to be its 
general contractor for work at its parking garage and on or about 
February 22, 2014, Sentry contracted with a subcontractor, 
Fortress, to install concrete and steel components at the garage.  
Sentry and Fortress memorialized their understanding in a letter 
(“the Agreement”) which required Fortress to provide all labor 
and equipment necessary to “perform the work in a workman-
like manner and in accordance with the acceptable standard of 
the trade.”  App. 82.  The Agreement further required Fortress to 
supervise the project until its completion.  In addition, the 
Agreement stipulated that “Sentry Builders Corporation and or 
Ramara, Inc. will NOT be responsible for the procedures or 
actions of Fortress Steel in its performance or deliveries to 
complete the work.”  App. 82.  Finally, the Agreement stated 
that “Fortress Steel will before commencement of work provide 
Sentry Builders Corp. insurance for Workmen’s Compensation 
and General Liability with the appropriate limits of coverage, 
said certificate(s) of insurance shall also include the landlord 
Ramara, Inc. as additional insured.”  App. 82.   
 
 Westfield issued a Certificate of Liability Insurance 
showing that Fortress was the named insured under a policy that 
provided $1 million of primary liability coverage for each 
occurrence and $9 million of umbrella coverage.  App. 173.  
Ramara and Sentry were listed as additional insureds under a 
typewritten section of the certificate entitled “Description of 
Operations/Locations /Vehicles.”  App. 68, 173.  The 
typewritten section reads: “RE: Project 444 City Avenue – 
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Additional Insureds include Ramara Inc. and Sentry Builders 
with regard to above referenced project.”  App. 68, 173.  
Fortress thereafter began work at the job site. 
   
 In April 2012, Axe was injured during the course of his 
employment by Fortress while working at Ramara’s parking 
garage.  Axe filed a lawsuit (“Axe”), the underlying action, 
seeking damages for his injuries in the Philadelphia County 
Court of Common Pleas against Ramara, as the property owner, 
and Sentry, as the general contractor, but he did not include 
Fortress, his employer, as a defendant, for, as we already have 
set forth, it would have had immunity in the action by reason of 
the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act.  See 77 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 481 (“The liability of an employer under this 
act shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other 
liability.”).  When Ramara sought a defense under the Policy, 
Westfield refused to provide that defense as it contended that the 
Policy did not insure Ramara for Axe’s claims arising from the 
accident.  
 
 B. Key Provisions of the Policy 
 
 Westfield predicated its denial of coverage on its 
interpretation of several provisions in the Policy now at issue on 
this appeal.  The two provisions that we need consider are the 
“Additional Insured – Owners, Lessees or Contractors – 
Automatic Status When Required in Construction Agreement 
With You” (“the Additional Insured Endorsement”) and an 
“Other Insurance Endorsement.”  The Additional Insured 
Endorsement in relevant part reads as follows: 
 




is amended to include as an 
additional insured any person or 
organization for whom you are 
performing operations when you 
and such person or organization 
have agreed in writing in a contract 
or agreement that such person or 
organization be added as an 
additional insured on your policy. 
Such person or organization is an 
additional insured only with respect 
to liability for ‘bodily injury,’ 
‘property damage,’ or ‘personal and 
advertising injury’ caused, in 
whole or in part, by: 
 
 1. Your acts or omissions; or 
 
 2. The acts or omissions of 
those acting on your behalf; 
   
in the performance of your ongoing 
operations for the additional 
insured. 
   
A person’s or organization’s status 
as an additional insured under this 
endorsement ends when your 
operations for that additional 




App. 105 (second emphasis added).  Westfield argues that for 
this paragraph to require it to defend Ramara in the Axe case, 
the complaint in that case must have alleged explicitly that 
Fortress’s acts or omissions proximately caused Axe’s injuries.   
 
 Ramara responds to Westfield’s interpretation of the 
Additional Insured Endorsement by arguing that it conflicts with 
the Policy’s Other Insurance Endorsement and therefore 
Westfield’s interpretation of the Additional Insured 
Endorsement would not be harmonious with the totality of the 
insurance contract.  The Other Insurance Endorsement provides, 
in relevant part: 
 
When required by written contract 
with any additional insured owner, 
lessee, or contractor to provide 
insurance on a primary and 
noncontributory basis, Condition 
4. of Section IV – Commercial 
Liability Conditions is deleted and 
replaced by the following: 
 
4. Other Insurance 
 
 If other valid and collectible 
insurance is available for  a loss 
we cover under Coverages A or B 
of this  Coverage Part, our 
obligations are limited as follows: 
 




 This insurance is primary 
and non-contributory except when 
b.  below applies. 
 
b. Excess Insurance 
 
 This insurance is excess 
over any of the other insurance, . . . 
 
 (4) If the loss is caused by 
the sole negligence of any 
additional insured owner, lessee, 
or contractor. 
 
App. 181 (first and last emphasis added).  Westfield claims that 
there is not a written contract providing additional insured 
coverage to Ramara on a “primary and non-contributory” basis.  
Thus, it contends that this provision is inapplicable in this case.  
Ramara, however, maintains that the Policy should be construed 
in its entirety, to give meaning to all of its provisions.  
Specifically, Ramara contends, for reasons that we explain 
below in detail, that when the contract is analyzed as a 
comprehensive document, Westfield’s interpretation of the 
Additional Insured Endorsement, in effect, would nullify the 
Other Insurance Endorsement.  According to Ramara, if we 
accept Westfield’s interpretation of the Additional Insured 
Endorsement, there never could be excess coverage under the 
Other Insurance Endorsement for such coverage would exist 
only for losses caused by Ramara’s “sole negligence” but the 
Additional Insured Endorsement would provide coverage for 
Ramara only for acts or omissions “caused in whole or in part” 
by Fortress or someone acting on its behalf.  
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 C. Procedural Background 
 Ramara claims to have expected that as an additional 
insured under the Policy, it would be protected from bodily 
injury claims arising out of Fortress’s work at the job site.  
Accordingly, after it received the Writ of Summons from the 
Axe lawsuit, Ramara tendered its defense to Westfield and 
requested that it defend Ramara in the Axe case and indemnify it 
from any judgment against it in that case.  As we explained 
above, Westfield declined to defend Ramara, claiming that 
Axe’s suit against Ramara did not trigger its obligation to 
defend Ramara under the Policy and its Additional Insured 
Endorsement.  In response, Ramara filed a declaratory judgment 
and breach of contract action against Westfield, Fortress, Sentry, 
and Axe in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.  But 
notwithstanding Ramara’s inclusion of additional parties as 
defendants, this case is essentially an action between Ramara 
and Westfield.  Westfield removed the action to the District 
Court.  
 In the District Court, Ramara moved for partial summary 
judgment on its claim that Westfield had a duty to defend it in 
the underlying Axe case.  Westfield cross-moved for summary 
judgment on the claim and sought a ruling that it did not have an 
obligation to defend Ramara.  Applying Pennsylvania law, the 
Court granted partial summary judgment to Ramara and denied 
summary judgment to Westfield in an order on November 24, 
2014.  The order included a provision that if Ramara sought 
reimbursement for its fees and costs to date in the Axe case it 
should submit an itemized list of these expenses and it gave 
Westfield an opportunity to object to Ramara’s claim.  Ramara 
submitted the list and the Court in a December 19, 2014 order 
entered judgment against Westfield for $104,965.71, the agreed 
12 
 
upon amount of counsel fees and costs that Ramara had accrued 
to date in defending the Axe case.  As part of the December 19, 
2014 order, the Court also mandated that Westfield 
“prospectively . . . provide defense to Ramara in the underlying 
action . . . .”  App. 21.   
 Westfield filed a timely Notice of Appeal on December 
23, 2014, appealing from the December 19, 2014 order.2  After 
the appeal was docketed in this Court, Ramara filed several 
motions in the District Court, including a motion to alter or 
amend the December 19, 2014 order and a motion to strike 
Westfield’s notice of appeal from the December 19, 2014 order. 
 Westfield opposed both motions.  On January 29, 2015, the 
District Court issued an order that, among other things, granted 
Ramara’s motion to strike Westfield’s notice of appeal from the 
December 19, 2014 order and partially granted Ramara’s motion 
to alter or amend the December 19, 2014 judgment.  On March 
2, 2015, Westfield filed an amended notice of appeal that 
included an appeal from the January 29, 2015 order. 
 
                                                 
2 Though the notice of appeal did not include an appeal from the 
November 24, 2014 order entered on the summary judgment 
motions, the parties have addressed matters that the District 
Court considered in its opinion on those motions.  In fact, 
Westfield starts the statement of the case portion of its brief on 
this appeal with the following sentence:  “Appellant . . . seeks 
reversal of the district court’s orders denying it summary 
judgment, and entering partial summary judgment in favor of 
Appellee . . . .”  Appellant’s br. at 4.  Thus, we will consider the 




 Our Clerk by an order on January 5, 2015, directed the 
parties to submit briefing on the question of whether we have 
jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.  The order noted that the 
December 19, 2014 order of the District Court from which 
Westfield had appealed did not appear to “dismiss[] all claims as 
to all parties and [that it] has not been certified under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 54(b).”  App. 392.  The Clerk subsequently issued a 
second order on March 30, 2015, affording the parties the 
opportunity to submit briefing on the District Court’s authority 
to issue an order “striking the notice of appeal . . . .”  App. 404.  
With all briefing now completed, we turn to the questions 
presented by this appeal.  
 
 
V.  DISCUSSION 
 
 We first must decide whether we have jurisdiction to hear 
this appeal.  See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94, 118 S.Ct. at 1012.  
After all, “[w]ithout jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all 
in any cause.”  Id. (citation omitted).  Then, if we conclude that 
we have jurisdiction, we will interpret the language of the Policy 
to determine whether the factual allegations in the underlying 
complaint “potentially” trigger coverage for Ramara in the Axe 
case.  See Am. Contract Bridge League v. Nationwide Mut. Fire 
Ins. Co., 752 F.2d 71, 75 (3d Cir. 1985) (applying Pennsylvania 
law).  In making these determinations, we view the factual 
allegations in the underlying Axe complaint as true and liberally 
construe them in Ramara’s favor as the insured.  See Frog, 
Switch & Mfg. Co., 193 F.3d at 746. 
 
 A. We Have Jurisdiction Because the District Court’s 
December 19, 2014 Order is a Mandatory Injunction Under 28 
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U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  
  
 In its December 19, 2014 order the District Court 
directed that “[p]rospectively, Westfield shall provide defense to 
Ramara in the underlying action . . . .”  App. 21.  Westfield 
appeals from this order and the January 29, 2015 order 
amending it.  Therefore, the question of whether we have 
jurisdiction over this appeal hinges on whether the December 
order qualifies as an injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), as 
that section provides the only possible basis for us to have 
jurisdiction, or instead is non-appealable.3 We conclude that the 
order is an injunction and thus we have jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal.    
 A district court’s injunctive order, even if it is not a final 
judgment, is immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(a)(1).  See Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 765 
F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 2014).  In a determination of whether an 
order is injunctive, a district court’s characterization of its order 
is not dispositive.  Thus, as the cases we discuss will explain, 
what counts is what the court actually did, not what it said it did. 
 See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 86-87, 94 S.Ct. 937, 951 
(1974).  Therefore, if a district court grants an interlocutory 
injunction, the order granting the injunction is appealable.   
Tokarcik v. Forest Hills Sch. Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 447 (3d Cir. 
1981).    
                                                 
3 Ramara correctly indicates in its brief that the “District Court’s 
December 19, 2014 Order granted only partial summary 
judgment because [the Court] held that Westfield owed Ramara 
a duty to defend in the underlying action but left outstanding the 
question of whether Westfield also owes Ramara a duty to 
indemnify.”  Appellee’s br. at 15. 
15 
 
 We emphasize that rather than using a labeling test, we 
use a functional test under which the nature of the relief in the 
order on appeal determines if an order is injunctive.  Cohen v. 
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Med. and Dentistry, 867 F.2d 1455, 
1466 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc).  In a functional test analysis, an 
order is injunctive if it: (1) adjudicates “some of the relief 
sought in the complaint”; and (2) is “of such a nature that if it 
grants relief it could be enforced pendente lite by contempt if 
necessary.”  Id. at 1465; see also Wright, Miller, Cooper & 
Gressman, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3922, 29 (3d ed. 
1977).   
 In circumstances similar to those here, we concluded that 
a grant of partial summary judgment was injunctive and, 
accordingly, was immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(a)(1).  See Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 356-57.  In Aleynikov, 
the appellee brought suit seeking indemnification and 
advancement of his attorney’s fees from the appellant, his 
former employer, arising from a criminal prosecution against 
him relating to his employment.  Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs 
Grp., Inc., No. CIV. 12-5994 KM, 2013 WL 5739137, at *1 
(D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2013).  Following expedited discovery, the 
district court granted the appellee’s motion for summary 
judgment with respect to his claims for advancement of certain 
fees, but denied his motion with respect to indemnification and 
indemnification-related fees.  Id. at *22.   
 On appeal, we stated that although the district court did 
not use the term “injunction” in its order granting partial 
summary judgment, the “nature of the relief granted” is 
determinative in deciding whether a remedy is equitable or legal. 
 Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 356.  We concluded that an order that 
prospectively grants an indeterminate amount of monetary relief 
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is equitable in nature.  As we explained in Aleynikov, “where an 
order for the payment of money is forward-looking and involves 
an amount that cannot be calculated with specificity, it is 
equitable.”  Because the order for partial summary judgment in 
Aleynikov adjudicated “some of the relief sought in the 
complaint” and granted relief that “could be enforced pendente 
lite by contempt if necessary,” we concluded that it was 
immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  Id.   
 Here, the District Court’s December 19, 2014 order 
granted relief similar to that in Aleynikov and thus the 
December 19, 2014 order is immediately appealable.  The order 
directing Westfield to defend Ramara prospectively is “an order 
for the payment of money” that is “forward-looking” and 
currently “indeterminate” because it requires Westfield to pay 
defense costs for the duration of the Axe action.  See Aleynikov, 
765 F.3d at 356-57.  The order granted Ramara “some of the 
relief” that it sought in the complaint and was enforceable 
pendente lite.  Nevertheless, Ramara contends that we do not 
have jurisdiction to review that order because, unlike the 
appellee in Aleynikov, Ramara does not request indemnification 
and indemnification-related fees.  Ramara’s observation is true 
but inapposite.   
 We reiterate that Aleynikov makes clear that the relief 
granted by a district court—not the relief sought by a party—
determines whether an order is injunctive.  Therefore, even 
though the appellee’s summary judgment motion in Aleynikov 
sought both indemnification and indemnification-related fees, 
our analysis focused on the nature of the relief that the district 
court actually granted by its order to determine whether that 
order was immediately appealable.  Moreover, Ramara’s 
proposed rule would allow a strategically drafted summary 
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judgment motion to block an interlocutory appeal under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) from an order entered on the motion any 
time the movant sought indemnification and indemnification-
related fees, regardless of the relief that the district court 
actually granted.  Neither our holding nor our reasoning in 
Aleynikov supports such a result.   
 Ramara’s motion for partial summary judgment in this 
case only sought relief with respect to Westfield’s duty to 
defend it in the Axe action.4  The District Court specifically 
noted in its January 29, 2015 order that the issue of Westfield’s 
duty to indemnify “is still outstanding and not yet ripe for 
resolution.”  App. 24.  Nevertheless, the Court’s December 19, 
2014 order directing Westfield to defend Ramara prospectively 
in the Axe lawsuit granted forward-looking monetary relief of 
an indeterminate amount.  See Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 356-57.  
In these circumstances, Aleynikov controls, and Ramara’s claim 
that our case law does not support Westfield’s position that it 
can appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) is simply wrong.  See 
Appellee’s br. at 18.  
 In reaching our result, we also note that other courts of 
appeals have addressed the precise question before us now.  For 
example, in W Holding Co. v. AIG Ins. Co.-Puerto Rico, the 
court found that it had jurisdiction over an appeal from a district 
court order directing the appellant insurer to advance the 
appellees’ defense costs.  748 F.3d 377, 382 (1st Cir. 2014).  
Reasoning that an order’s nature “depends on its operative terms 
and effects,” the court concluded that “the [district] judge’s cost-
                                                 
4 Ramara also moved for summary judgment regarding its 
related claim for breach of contract for failure to defend, but we 
need not discuss this claim.  
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advancement order certainly seem[ed] to fit the bill” of an 
appealable injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  Id. at 382-
83 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  Similarly, 
in Westar Energy, Inc. v. Lake the court determined that it had 
jurisdiction over an appeal from a district court’s order that 
directed the appellant corporation to advance criminal defense 
costs to the appellee on a prospective basis.  552 F.3d 1215, 
1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 2009).  Although the district court granted 
relief in that case that “was not labelled an injunction,” the court 
of appeals nonetheless concluded that the relief was “equitable 
in nature” and therefore the order was immediately appealable 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  Id. at 1223-24.   
 There are other courts of appeals’ decisions supporting 
our result.  For example, in Pacific Insurance Co. v. General 
Development Corp. the court found that it could exercise 
jurisdiction over a district court’s order granting partial 
summary judgment to appellees and directing the appellant 
insurer to pay their defense costs pending resolution of its 
rescission claim.  28 F.3d 1093, 1095-96 (11th Cir. 1994).   
Because the interlocutory order mandated that the “insurer pay [] 
defense costs,” the court held that it was an immediately 
appealable injunction for purposes of § 1292(a)(1).5  Id. at 1096 
(citation omitted); see also Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Fed. Ins. 
Co., 370 F. App’x 563, 567, 568 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a 
district court’s order “enjoining [the insurer] from failing and 
refusing to pay” the appellee’s defense costs “fit[s] the 
requirements . . . . [of] an injunctive order, over which we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)”); Gon v. First State 
Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that an order 
                                                 
5 The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as moot for reasons 
that we need not explain as they are immaterial here. 
19 
 
directing an insurer to pay the insured’s defense expenses as 
they were incurred “met the general definition of an injunction” 
and was immediately appealable).  
 In light of our reasoning buttressed by decisions of other 
courts of appeals, we are satisfied that we have jurisdiction over 
the District Court’s December 19, 2014 order directing 
Westfield to defend Ramara prospectively.  Although the order 
did enter judgment in Ramara’s favor against Westfield for 
$104,965.71 in already-accrued legal fees and costs—relief that 
is legal in nature—the order also directed Westfield to defend 
Ramara going forward and thus it granted equitable relief and 
was immediately appealable.  Though Ramara moved to amend 
the December 19, 2014 order by striking its forward-looking 
language as it contends that it did not seek that relief in the 
District Court, the Court’s January 29, 2015 order clarified that 
the December order had not terminated the entire action and did 
not remove the forward-looking relief.6  App. 26.    
                                                 
6 The District Court said in its January 29, 2015 order that the 
December 19, 2014 order should not be “considered a dismissal 
of this action.”  App. 26.  We are confident that the Court 
intended to say that the order did not terminate the action.  
Though, as we explain below, the District Court did not have 
jurisdiction to alter or amend the December 19, 2014 order after 
Westfield filed its initial appeal, nevertheless we see no reason 
why we should not consider the January 29, 2015 order when we 
determine the Court’s intent in entering the December 19, 2014 
order.  It may seem strange that Ramara moved to strike the 
seemingly favorable, forward-looking relief from the December 
19, 2014 order, but it may have done so in the hope of that order 
being a final order subject to execution.  We do not address the 
possible question of whether if Westfield challenged the 
20 
 
 It is clear that the relief the District Court granted by its 
December 19, 2014 order is prospective, grants some of the 
relief that Ramara requested, and could be enforced pendente 
lite by contempt, if necessary.  See Cohen, 867 F.2d at 1466.  
Despite the District Court’s characterization of the December 
19, 2014 order in its January 29, 2015 order as one granting 
“specific performance of a contract term,” App. 25-26, the relief 
granted in the December 19, 2014 order was in part equitable.  
Consequently, the District Court’s December 19, 2014 order 
includes a mandatory injunction and is immediately appealable 
at least to the extent that it granted equitable relief under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).7  
                                                                                                             
$104,965.71 judgment on the ground that it was excessive we 
could review that noninjunctive aspect of the December 19, 
2014 order for the parties agreed on the computation.  As a 
practical matter, we do not doubt that if Westfield prevailed on 
the merits on its injunctive appeal it would seek relief in the 
District Court from the monetary judgment. 
 
7 The Clerk of this Court issued an order on March 30, 2015, 
affording the parties the opportunity to submit argument relating 
to whether the District Court had authority to issue orders 
striking Westfield’s notice of appeal, and whether it had 
authority to strike Westfield’s then-pending amended notice of 
appeal.  The parties submitted arguments on the topic, but on 
April 20, 2015, the District Court issued an order denying 
Ramara’s motion to strike Westfield’s amended notice of appeal 
as moot because this appeal was pending.  In any event, it is 
clear that we have jurisdiction over this appeal and thus the 
District Court lacked authority to strike Westfield’s notice of 
appeal.  See Murphy v. Fed. Ins. Co., 206 F. App’x 143, 147 (3d 
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 B. Ramara as an Additional Insured under the Policy 
is entitled to a Defense in the Axe Case. 
 With the jurisdictional issue behind us, we turn now to 
the question of whether the underlying complaint supported the 
District Court’s conclusion that Westfield owed Ramara a duty 
to defend it in the Axe lawsuit.  An insurer’s duty to defend “is a 
distinct obligation” that is “different from and broader than the 
duty to indemnify.”  Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 
214, 225 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).  Because an 
insurer’s duty to defend its insured in a lawsuit is broader than 
                                                                                                             
Cir. 2006) (“In Venen v. Sweet, 758 F.2d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 
1985), we pointed out that as a general rule ‘the timely filing of 
a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance, 
immediately conferring jurisdiction on a Court of Appeals and 
divesting a district court of its control over those aspects of the 
case involved in the appeal.’”); Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l 
Ass’n Local 19 v. Herre Bros., Inc., 198 F.3d 391, 394 (3d Cir. 
1999) (“It is well established that ‘[t]he filing of a notice of 
appeal . . . confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and 
divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the 
case involved in the appeal.’” (citation omitted)); cf. Fed. R. 
App. P. 42(a) (stating that a district court’s ability to grant a 
motion to withdraw an appeal is limited to the time “before an 
appeal has been docketed by the circuit clerk”).  Importantly, 
Ramara filed its first motion in the District Court to strike 
Westfield’s notice of appeal on January 6, 2015, which was after 
the Clerk docketed Westfield’s notice of appeal.  Finally, we 
point out that inasmuch as we have jurisdiction any ruling on the 
District Court’s authority to issue such orders would not change 




its duty to indemnify, it necessarily follows that it will not have 
a duty to indemnify an insured for a judgment in an action for 
which it was not required to provide defense.  Id. (citations 
omitted).8  Under Pennsylvania law, which is applicable on the 
insurance coverage issue, a court ascertaining whether an insurer 
has a duty to defend its insured makes its determination by 
defining the scope of coverage under the insurance policy on 
which the insured relies and comparing the scope of coverage to 
the allegations of the underlying complaint.  Id. at 226; see also 
Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Allen, 692 A.2d 1089, 1095 
(Pa. 1997).  If the allegations of the underlying complaint 
potentially could support recovery under the policy, there will be 
coverage at least to the extent that the insurer has a duty to 
defend its insured in the case.  Sikirica, 416 F.3d at 226 (citing 
Gen Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 692 A.2d at 1095).   
 As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained, “[i]f 
the complaint filed against the insured avers facts which would 
support a recovery that is covered by the policy, it is the duty of 
the insurer to defend until such time as the claim is confined to a 
recovery that the policy does not cover.”  Erie Ins. Exch. v. 
Transamerica Ins. Co., 533 A.2d 1363, 1368 (Pa. 1987) 
(citations omitted); see also Stidham v. Millvale Sportsmen’s 
Club, 618 A.2d 945, 953-54 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (“If coverage 
(indemnification) depends upon the existence or nonexistence of 
                                                 
8 We are concerned here with a situation in which the insured, 
Ramara, in this litigation is relying on only a single insurance 
policy for coverage.  Thus, we do not suggest that when multiple 
policies cover a single loss, such as when there is excess 
coverage over basic coverage, that the excess insurer cannot 
have a duty to indemnify an insured even though it did not have 
a duty to defend the insured against the action. 
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undetermined facts outside the complaint, until the claim is 
narrowed to one patently outside the policy coverage, the insurer 
has a duty to defend claims against its insured.”).  Importantly, 
Pennsylvania adheres to the “four corners” rule (also known as 
the “eight corners” rule), under which an insurer’s potential duty 
to defend is “determined solely by the allegations of the 
complaint in the [underlying] action.”  Kvaerner Metals Div. of 
Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 
888, 896 (Pa. 2006) (“Kvaerner”) (emphasis in original) 
(citation omitted).  Under the four corners rule, a court in 
determining if there is coverage does not look outside the 
allegations of the underlying complaint or consider extrinsic 
evidence.  Id.9 
 
 To determine whether based on its factual allegations an 
underlying complaint triggers an insurer’s duty to defend, a 
court views the allegations as true and “liberally construe[s 
them] in favor of the insured.”  Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co., 193 
F.3d at 746 (citation omitted).  An insurer must defend its 
insured until it becomes absolutely clear that there is no longer a 
possibility that the insurer owes its insured a defense.  See Am. 
& Foreign Ins. Co. v. Jerry’s Sport Ctr., Inc., 2 A.3d 526, 541 
(Pa. 2010) (“As long as the complaint might or might not fall 
within the policy’s coverage, the insurance company is obliged 
to defend . . . . [I]t is the potential, rather than the certainty, of a 
claim falling within the insurance policy that triggers the 
insurer’s duty to defend.”) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Thus, an insurer has a duty to defend if there is any 
                                                 
9 There will be eight corners because a court in deciding if there 




possibility that its coverage has been triggered by allegations in 
the underlying complaint.  Id.  With these principles in mind, 
and after reviewing the Policy with its endorsements, we 
conclude that Westfield has a duty to defend Ramara in the Axe 
action because based on the factual allegations in the complaint 
the Axe complaint potentially triggers coverage. 
 
  1.  The Allegations of the Axe Complaint 
Potentially Implicate Fortress Under Both a “Proximate Cause” 
or “But For” Causation Standard. 
 
 At bottom, this case concerns whether the Axe complaint 
sufficiently alleges, as required by the Additional Insured 
Endorsement, that Axe’s injuries potentially were “caused, in 
whole or in part” by Fortress’s acts or omissions or the acts or 
omissions of someone acting on Fortress’s behalf.  If it does, 
then Ramara is an additional insured under the Policy with 
respect to the Axe action and is entitled to a defense in that case. 
 If it does not, then Ramara is not an additional insured with 
respect to the Axe action and Westfield does not have a duty to 
defend Ramara.  We decide this question by comparing the 
allegations of the Axe complaint to the language of the Policy.  
See Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 896.  We reiterate that our 
interpretation of the Policy is a question of law over which we 
exercise plenary review.  See 401 Fourth Street v. Investors Ins. 
Co., 879 A.2d 166, 170 (Pa. 2005).  In addition, we must 
construe any ambiguities in the Policy “in favor of the insured to 
further the contract’s prime purpose of indemnification and 
against the insurer, as the insurer drafts the policy, and controls 
coverage.”  Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 897 (citation omitted).   
 In support of its contention that the allegations of the Axe 
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complaint fall outside of the Policy, Westfield first relies on 
language in the Additional Insured Endorsement.  Specifically, 
Westfield claims that under Dale Corp. v. Cumberland Mutual 
Fire Insurance Co., No. 09-1115, 2010 WL 4909600 (E.D. Pa. 
Nov. 30, 2010), the endorsement’s language that requires Axe’s 
“bodily injury” to be “caused, in whole or in part” by Fortress’s 
acts or omissions, or someone acting on its behalf, limits 
coverage to situations in which Axe explicitly alleges that 
Fortress proximately caused his injuries.  Westfield contends 
that the Axe complaint does not contain such allegations and 
therefore it does not have a duty to defend Ramara in the Axe 
action.   
 In response, Ramara largely repeats the arguments that it 
made in the District Court.  Ramara starts from the premise that 
Pennsylvania courts have not interpreted the “caused, in whole 
or in part” language of the Additional Insured Endorsement.  
Ramara then asserts that the interpretation advanced by the 
district court in Dale Corp. and on which Westfield relies is 
more restrictive than that which the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court likely would adopt.  Ramara contends that Fortress’s 
conduct need only have been a “but-for” cause of Axe’s injuries 
to entitle it to a defense in the Axe case.  Moreover, Ramara 
maintains that even if we adopt Westfield’s “proximate cause” 
argument with respect to Fortress’s conduct, the allegations of 
the Axe complaint still would entitle it to that defense. 
 Like the District Court, we find that Westfield must 
defend Ramara under either the “but-for” or “proximate cause” 
interpretation of the Additional Insured Endorsement.  Because 
a proximate cause requirement is more demanding than a but-for 
cause requirement—meaning that allegations satisfying the 
former necessarily will satisfy the latter, though the opposite is 
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not true but is possible—we first will consider whether the 
allegations of the Axe complaint suffice under the proximate 
cause test.  Proximate causation is defined as a cause which was 
“a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm.”  
Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d 765, 771 (3d Cir. 
2009); see also Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1284 (Pa. 
1978); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 (1965).  The 
concept is essentially a limiting principle that functions as 
“shorthand for the policy-based judgment that not all factual 
causes contributing to an injury should be legally cognizable 
causes.”  CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S.Ct. 2630, 2642 
(2011).10  We therefore must determine whether the Axe 
complaint potentially alleges that Fortress’s acts or omissions 
were a substantial factor in Axe being injured.  
 The Axe complaint is rife with allegations satisfying the 
proximate cause test.  In his complaint, Axe alleges that Fortress 
employed him at the time of his accident, and that Sentry 
engaged Fortress as an independent contractor.11  He claims that 
                                                 
10 A clear example of a “but-for” cause of an injury that is not its 
proximate cause is if a cab is late in picking up a fare and, while 
taking the fare to his destination, is involved in an accident 
while being driven without any negligence or excess speed.  The 
driver’s tardiness would be a but-for cause of the accident 
because the accident would not have happened if the cab had 
been on time for if it had been on time it would not have been at 
the scene of the accident.  Nevertheless, the driver would not be 
liable on a theory that he was late, because his lateness would 
not be regarded as a proximate cause of the accident.  
 
11 Westfield emphasizes that the Axe complaint characterizes 
Fortress as Sentry’s “independent contractor” rather than its 
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he was injured severely when he fell through an opening in the 
garage deck while attempting to set beam clips in the course of 
his normal duties at the job site.  Axe also alleges that Ramara 
“act[ed] by and through its agents, servants and/or employees” 
and “fail[ed] to adequately inspect and monitor the work 
performed.”  App. 47; App. 49.  As the District Court observed, 
if Axe was injured during the course of his normal duties at the 
job site, and the injury was caused by the acts or omission of 
Ramara’s “agents,” “contractors,” or “subcontractors”—of 
which Fortress was one—these allegations raise at least the 
potential that Fortress’s conduct was a proximate cause of his 
injuries.  Ramara, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 496. 
 In addition, Axe pleads that Ramara “failed to provide 
and require that equipment be used in accordance with industry 
standards.”  App. 49.  He further avers that Ramara “employed 
and/or retained, or [was] obligated to employ field personnel, 
                                                                                                             
subcontractor.  Appellant’s br. at 18; Appellant’s reply br. at 7 
n.1.  But an analysis of the allegations of the Axe complaint 
makes it clear that Fortress potentially is implicated as one of 
Ramara’s contractors or subcontractors and the circumstance 
that it may have been an “independent contractor” would not 
change that result.  After all, the Axe complaint hinges liability 
on Ramara’s acts and omissions by and through its “contractors 
and subcontractors,” and thus the complaint has at least the 
potential to implicate Fortress.  This result is especially clear 
inasmuch as we must liberally construe the factual allegations of 
the underlying complaint in favor of Ramara.  See Frog, Switch 
& Mfg. Co., 193 F.3d at 746 (citation omitted) (explaining that 
to determine whether an underlying complaint triggers an 
insurer’s duty to defend, its factual allegations must be “liberally 
construed in favor of the insured”).    
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project supervisors and safety inspectors to inspect the work 
being performed” at the job site.  App. 49.  Yet, Fortress’s 
employees used equipment that Fortress owned and performed 
work that Axe asserted necessarily fell within the scope of 
Ramara’s supervision.  App. 82.  Finally, Axe claims that 
Ramara was negligent by failing to: (1) hire competent 
contractors and subcontractors; (2) perform “construction 
services” in manner consistent with the prevailing standard of 
care in the construction industry; (3) supervise the construction 
work; (4) coordinate with the other entities and subcontractors 
on the premises; and (5) enforce a site specific fall protection 
plan.  App. 52-53.   
 Taken together and construed liberally in favor of 
Ramara for purposes of this insurance coverage case, these 
allegations partially base Ramara’s liability on its failure to 
supervise the work of its contractors or subcontractors who used 
equipment improperly and disregarded a site specific fall 
protection plan, all while performing their work in violation of 
the industry’s standard of care.  Fortress, though engaged by 
Sentry, was one of Ramara’s subcontractors, and Axe’s 
employment by Fortress was the sole reason that Axe was at the 
job site and was injured.  Clearly, Axe made factual allegations 
that potentially would support a conclusion that Axe’s injuries 
were “caused, in whole or in part” by Fortress’s acts or 
omissions.  Of course, we need not and, indeed, cannot decide 
whether Axe will succeed on these claims at trial.  Ramara only 
must show that the Axe complaint, when liberally construed in 
favor of Ramara, includes allegations to support a conclusion 
that Fortress was potentially negligent and that its negligence 
was a proximate cause of Axe’s injuries.  We conclude that it 
does.  Accordingly, Ramara comes within the Additional 
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Insured Endorsement of the Policy with respect to the Axe case. 
 Therefore, Ramara is entitled to a defense in the Axe case even 
under Westfield’s narrow interpretation of the Additional 
Insured Endorsement limiting coverage to situations in which an 
insured’s contractor’s actions proximately caused a plaintiff’s 
injuries. 
  2.  The Other Insurance Endorsement Supports 
Ramara’s Interpretation of the Additional Insured Endorsement. 
  
 Although Ramara qualifies as an additional insured under 
either the “but-for” or “proximate cause” interpretation of the 
Additional Insured Endorsement, we point out that Ramara’s 
but-for causation interpretation is correct.  In the District Court, 
Ramara argued that the language of the Additional Insured 
Endorsement was not easy to reconcile with the Other Insurance 
Endorsement under Westfield’s proximate cause interpretation.  
The District Court agreed, concluding that the language of the 
Other Insurance Endorsement supported Ramara’s 
interpretation.  We also conclude that the Other Insurance 
Endorsement supports Ramara’s but-for reading.  
 A court’s function when interpreting an insurance policy 
under Pennsylvania law, is “to ascertain the intent of the parties 
as manifested by the language of the written instrument.”  Am. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Murray, 658 F.3d 311, 320 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  A court must 
read the policy “as a whole and construe[  ] [it] according to the 
plain meaning of its terms.”  C.H. Heist Caribe Corp. v. Am. 
Home Assurance Co., 640 F.2d 479, 481 (3d Cir. 1981).  A 
court construes commonly used words and phrases “in their 
natural, plain, and ordinary sense, with [the] court free to consult 
a dictionary to inform its understanding of terms.”  Am. Auto. 
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Ins. Co., 658 F.3d at 320-21 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  But if those terms are open to more than one 
interpretation, they are regarded as ambiguous.  Med. Protective 
Co. v. Watkins, 198 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1999).  It is well 
established that “[a]mbiguous provisions in an insurance policy 
must be construed against the insurer and in favor of the 
insured; any reasonable interpretation offered by the insured, 
therefore, must control.”  Id. at 104 (citation omitted).  
Pennsylvania courts apply this rule liberally.  Id. 
 Under the Policy, the Other Insurance Endorsement 
provides that an additional insured such as Ramara is entitled to 
excess coverage for a loss caused by its sole negligence.  The 
District Court concluded that under Westfield’s proximate cause 
interpretation of the Additional Insured Endorsement it would 
be impossible for an additional insured to have excess coverage 
under the Other Insurance Endorsement.  The District Court 
reasoned that a loss caused by Ramara’s sole negligence—which 
is necessary to trigger excess coverage under the Other 
Insurance Endorsement—could not be proximately caused 
simultaneously by Fortress’s acts or omissions which Westfield 
contended was necessary for Ramara to have coverage.  Ramara, 
69 F. Supp. 3d at 497.  On appeal, Westfield argues that: (1) the 
apparent discrepancy between the Other Insurance and 
Additional Insured Endorsements under its interpretation is 
immaterial because the former endorsement is inapplicable to 
this case; and (2) as a result, the District Court’s discussion of 
the Other Insured Endorsement constituted an advisory opinion. 
 We cannot agree on either of these points. 
 Courts must interpret an insurance policy as one, 
harmonious document and resolve ambiguities in favor of 
coverage.  See Med. Protective Co., 198 F.3d at 104; C.H. Heist 
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Caribe Corp., 640 F.2d at 481.  In interpreting a policy as a 
whole, and resolving potential ambiguities, a court often must 
compare the language used in one provision of the policy with 
the language in another provision.  Indeed, it would be difficult 
for a court to read a policy as a comprehensive document and 
unearth potential ambiguities if the court was required to 
interpret the provisions of a policy in isolation.  Moreover, if a 
relevant provision is shown to be ambiguous, other policy 
provisions can assist a court in assessing whether the insured 
party’s interpretation of that provision is reasonable.  Inasmuch 
as the District Court’s understanding of the Other Insured 
Endorsement supported its result, its discussion of the point 
cannot be dismissed as an advisory opinion. 
  3.  The Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act. 
 Finally, Westfield argues that coverage was not triggered 
because one party is conspicuously absent from the allegations 
in the Axe complaint: Fortress.  Indeed, Axe explicitly names 
Fortress only once in his underlying complaint, stating that 
Fortress was his employer at the time that he was injured.  As a 
result, Westfield maintains that the Axe complaint is “silent as 
to any acts or omissions by Fortress,” and thus Westfield does 
not have a duty under the Policy with the Additional Insured 
Endorsement to defend Ramara when Pennsylvania’s four 
corners rule is applied.   
 The District Court disagreed, finding that the sparse 
reference to Fortress in the Axe complaint was understandable 
in light of the Workers’ Compensation Act’s grant of tort 
immunity to employers for workplace injuries to their 
employees.  Ramara, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 500-01; see also 77 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 481 (“The liability of an employer under this 
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act shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other liability 
to such employes.”).  Due to the immunity from tort liability 
afforded to employers for injury to their employees in 
circumstances in which compensation is provided by the Act, 
the District Court reasoned that Westfield’s narrow 
interpretation of the underlying complaint “ignore[d] the 
realities of the worksite” and “the effect of the Pennsylvania 
Workers’ Compensation Act.”  Ramara, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 499.  
On appeal, we must decide whether the District Court’s 
consideration of the Act and its effect on pleading violated 
Pennsylvania’s four corners rule.  
 At the outset, we find it instructive to retrace the 
boundaries of the four corners rule.  In Pennsylvania, a 
determination of whether an insurer has a duty to defend is made 
“solely by [consideration of] the allegations of the complaint in 
the [underlying] action.”  Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 896 (emphasis 
in original) (citation omitted).  However, “[i]f coverage 
(indemnification) depends upon the existence or nonexistence of 
undetermined facts outside the complaint, until the [plaintiff’s] 
claim is narrowed to one patently outside the policy coverage, 
the insurer has a duty to defend claims against its insured.”  
Stidham, 618 A.2d at 953-54.  If the complaint “might or might 
not fall within the policy’s coverage, the insurance company is 
obliged to defend.”  Am. & Foreign Ins. Co., 2 A.3d at 541 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  It is therefore 
“the potential, rather than the certainty, of a claim falling within 
the insurance policy that triggers the insurer’s duty to defend.”  
Id.  
 This understanding of the four corners rule is important, 
because neither our own research nor the parties’ briefing has 
revealed a case in which we previously have spoken on how a 
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court should deal with the practical effects of the Workers’ 
Compensation Act on pleadings where Pennsylvania’s four 
corners rule is relevant.  In a factually analogous case, however, 
a district court persuasively emphasized substance over form 
while making a determination faithful to the four corners rule.  
The court explained: 
The purpose behind [the four 
corners rule] is that an insurer 
should not be required to defend a 
claim when it is apparent on the 
face of the complaint that none of 
the injuries fall within the purview 
of the insurance policy. Given the 
circumstances of this case, that 
purpose would not be well served 
by blindly following Plaintiff’s 
insistence that the Court apply the 
most restrictive interpretation of the 
four corners rule. Due to the 
immunity conferred by the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act, 
[the plaintiff in the underlying 
action] could not have sued his 
employer, . . . and, thus, would not 
have included any allegations about 
[it] in his underlying complaint. 
Nonetheless, [the insurer] has 
expressly stipulated that it knew 
[the plaintiff] was injured while 
performing duties on a job site in 
the scope of his employment with 
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[the insured]. . . . Given [the 
insurer]’s obvious knowledge of 
the existence of facts that could 
trigger coverage and its awareness 
of [the plaintiff]’s reason for not 
including them, it would be both 
illogical and unjust for this Court to 
find that [the insurer]’s duty to 
defend was not triggered. 
Selective Ins. Co. v. Lower Providence Twp., No. 12-0800, 
2013 WL 3213348, at *10 n.6 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2013) 
(“Selective Insurance”); see also Dale Corp., 2010 WL 4909600, 
at *7 n.6.    
 Importantly, the Selective Insurance court considered the 
Workers’ Compensation Act’s effects as part of the broader 
context within which the factual allegations of the underlying 
complaint were made, and within which the insurer denied 
coverage.  But the court considered the Act only to the extent 
that the consideration was useful in a determination of whether 
the factual allegations of the complaint potentially fell within the 
scope of coverage.  We find this analytical approach to be 
consistent with Pennsylvania’s four corners rule and applicable 
to this case.   
 With Selective Insurance in mind, it is clear that the 
District Court properly considered the effect of the Workers’ 
Compensation Act.  The four corners rule—even under 
Pennsylvania’s strict construction—does not permit an insurer to 
make its coverage decision with blinders on, disclaiming any 
knowledge of coverage-triggering facts.  Quite the opposite, 
knowledge that an injured employee has a claim under the 
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Workers’ Compensation Act must be factored into a 
determination of whether his allegations in an underlying tort 
complaint potentially trigger an obligation on an insurer to 
provide coverage for a defendant in the underlying case.  If an 
insurer fails to account for the Act it may construe the factual 
allegations of an underlying complaint too narrowly, and “the 
insurer who refuses to defend at the outset does so at its own 
peril.”  Aetna Cas. & Sur. v. Roe, 650 A.2d 94, 99 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1994).   
 It is also proper to consider the Workers’ Compensation 
Act because the factual allegations of an underlying complaint 
must “be taken as true and liberally construed in favor of the 
insured.”  Post v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., 691 F.3d 500, 517 
(3d Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
In cases in which the Act is relevant, a liberal construction of 
the factual allegations of the underlying complaint often may 
result in the complaint triggering coverage where the same 
allegations might appear insufficient in the absence of the Act.  
Indeed, Westfield’s narrow interpretation of the factual 
allegations of the Axe complaint provides an apt example of 
how proceeding as though the Act is irrelevant risks leaving an 
insured party without the coverage to which it is entitled.  
Westfield’s approach would turn what is meant to be a liberal 
construction rule on its head; it would disfavor insured parties 
and permit insurers to deny coverage under the Additional 
Insured Endorsement in all but the most clear-cut cases in which 
the plaintiff pleads his underlying complaint so as to avoid 
attributing his injury to his employer’s acts or omissions.  But 
the courts have made clear that ambiguities in insurance policies 
with respect to the scope of coverage are resolved in favor of 
there being coverage, and Westfield cannot escape its obligation 
36 
 
to defend Ramara under any interpretation of the four corners 
rule or the Policy language.  
 We emphasize that in affirming the District Court’s 
analytical approach we do not intend our opinion to be read as 
an expansion or modification of Pennsylvania’s strict 
interpretation of the four corners rule.  See, e.g., Kvaerner, 908 
A.2d at 896; see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Estate of 
Mehlman, 589 F.3d 105, 108 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009).  Indeed, 
inasmuch as we are applying Pennsylvania law we could not do 
so.  Clearly, a court taking into account the four corners rule 
must take care to base its analysis of the complaint on its factual 
allegations.  Rather, we hold that where the Workers’ 
Compensation Act is relevant to a coverage determination, 
insurers (and the courts that review their determinations) must 
interpret the allegations of an underlying complaint recognizing 
that the plaintiff’s attorney in the underlying action drafted the 
complaint taking the existence of the Act into account.12  In this 
way, the Act operates as an interpretive constraint, making it 
more difficult for insurers to claim that the allegations of an 
underlying complaint fall patently outside the scope of 
                                                 
12 We are not suggesting that insurers have a duty to make 
investigations to find facts or information beyond those set forth 
in the complaint in order to find a basis for triggering coverage.  
Thus, we cannot agree with Mortgage Express Inc. v. Tudor 
Insurance Co., 771 N.W.2d 137, 147 (Neb. 2009), to the extent 
that it broadly indicated that “[i]n determining its duty to defend, 
an insurer must not only look to the petition or complaint filed 
against its insured, but must also investigate and ascertain the 




coverage.13  This result is consistent with the four corners rule 
and the principles underlying policy interpretation itself.  See 
Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 897 (explaining that if any provision of 
an insurance policy is ambiguous, “the policy is to be construed 
in favor of the insured to further the contract’s prime purpose of 
indemnification and against the insurer, as the insurer drafts the 
policy, and controls coverage”). 
 The District Court simply reaffirmed what should be 
obvious: an insurer cannot bury its head in the sand and disclaim 
any knowledge of coverage-triggering facts.  See, e.g., 
Revelation Indus., Inc. v St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. Co., 206 P.3d 
919, 928 (Mont. 2009) (“An insurer cannot ignore knowledge of 
facts that may give rise to coverage under the policy simply 
because the complaint—which is, after all, drafted by a claimant 
over whose draftsmanship the insured has no control—does not 
allege these facts of which the insurer has knowledge.”).  
Westfield was certainly aware of the Workers’ Compensation 
Act’s limitation on the type of allegations that Axe could bring 
when it decided to deny coverage to Ramara.  Westfield also 
surely knew that despite the circumstance that the Act does not 
contain pleading limitations in third party actions, the practical 
effect of its grant of tort immunity to employers was that Axe’s 
attorney in drawing the complaint neither would explicitly name 
Fortress nor feature it prominently in the complaint’s 
allegations.  Within this context and applying Pennsylvania law, 
                                                 
13 We do not question the right of an insurer to undertake a 
defense of its insured under a reservation of rights or to bring a 
declaratory action to settle the scope, if any, of its obligations 





Westfield could not have determined reasonably that the 
allegations of the Axe complaint were patently outside the 
Policy’s coverage.  The District Court properly compared the 
allegations of the Axe complaint to the language of the Policy 
under Pennsylvania’s four corners rule, and it correctly found 
that Ramara qualifies as an additional insured entitled to a 
defense in the Axe case under the Policy.  It did not err by not 
making this determination in a vacuum.  
 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 We conclude our opinion with a disposition of 
Westfield’s appeal with respect to the January 29, 2015 District 
Court order.  As we indicated, that order purported to alter or 
amend the December 19, 2014 order even though Westfield 
already had appealed from the December 19, 2014 order.  As we 
further indicated, the District Court did not have jurisdiction to 
alter or amend the December 19, 2014 order with respect to the 
aspects of that order on appeal.  See infra note 7.  Consequently 
we will vacate the January 29, 2015 order to the extent that it 
purported to alter or amend the December 19, 2014 order.  
Inasmuch as there are no issues on this appeal with respect to 
the January 29, 2015 order other than those with which we have 
dealt, except to the extent that we are vacating the January 29, 
2015 order, we will dismiss the appeal from that order. 
 In dealing with the merits of this appeal from the 
December 19, 2014 order, for the reasons we have stated we will 
affirm the District Court’s order to the extent that it provided 
that Westfield has a duty to defend Ramara in the underlying 
Axe action.  Though we recognize that we are not in terms 
affirming the order for the payment of fees and costs accrued to 
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date in the amount of $104,965.71, the effect of our opinion is to 
uphold that order.  We are not dealing in express terms with that 
aspect of the December 19, 2014 order, see infra note 6, because 
it is not an award of forward-looking injunctive relief and the 
parties have not briefed the question of whether Westfield can 
appeal at this time from that portion of that order. 
 
